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Abstract
Social networking websites face a constant barrage of spam,
unwanted messages that distract, annoy, and even defraud
honest users. These messages tend to be very short, mak-
ing them difficult to identify in isolation. Furthermore, spam-
mers disguise their messages to look legitimate, tricking users
into clicking on links and tricking spam filters into tolerat-
ing their malicious behavior. Thus, some spam filters exam-
ine relational structure in the domain, such as connections
among users and messages, to better identify deceptive con-
tent. However, even when it is used, relational structure is
often exploited in an incomplete or ad hoc manner.
In this paper, we present Extended Group-based Graphical
models for Spam (EGGS), a general-purpose method for clas-
sifying spam in online social networks. Rather than labeling
each message independently, we group related messages to-
gether when they have the same author, the same content,
or other domain-specific connections. To reason about re-
lated messages, we combine two popular methods: stacked
graphical learning (SGL) and probabilistic graphical mod-
els (PGM). Both methods capture the idea that messages are
more likely to be spammy when related messages are also
spammy, but they do so in different ways – SGL uses sequen-
tial classifier predictions and PGMs use probabilistic infer-
ence. We apply our method to four different social network
domains. EGGS is more accurate than an independent model
in most experimental settings, especially when the correct la-
bel is uncertain. For the PGM implementation, we compare
Markov logic networks to probabilistic soft logic and find that
both work well with neither one dominating, and the combi-
nation of SGL and PGMs usually performs better than either
on its own.
Introduction
Social spam (Chu, Widjaja, and Wang 2012) is any un-
solicited or unwanted action by a user in a social net-
work. Many methods have been developed to detect spam
based on the content of the messages themselves (Blanzieri
and Bryl 2008; Costa et al. 2013; Ferragina, Piccinno,
and Santoro 2015; Liu et al. 2016; Ma, Sun, and Cong
2013; Wang and Pu 2015; Xu, Sun, and Javaid 2016;
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Figure 1: EGGS workflow, with example relational rules
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Zhang, Zhu, and Liang 2012), the graph structure among
users and messages (Akoglu, Chandy, and Faloutsos 2013;
Boykin and Roychowdhury 2005; Fakhraei et al. 2015;
Ghosh et al. 2012; O’Callaghan et al. 2012; Rayana and
Akoglu 2015), the timing of user actions (Fei et al. 2013;
Stringhini, Kruegel, and Vigna 2010; Tan et al. 2013;
Viswanath et al. 2014; Wang and Pu 2015; Zhu et al. 2012),
and more. This works well when there are clear patterns that
distinguish spam from non-spam, but can fail when spam-
mers obfuscate their behavior. A complementary approach is
to exploit relationships among different users and messages,
so that known spammers and spam can be used to iden-
tify other spammers and spam (Akoglu, Chandy, and Falout-
sos 2013; Fakhraei et al. 2015; Li et al. 2014a; Rayana and
Akoglu 2015; Laorden et al. 2011; Chen, Tan, and Jain 2009;
Wu et al. 2015). This works well when there are strong pre-
dictive relationships linking entities, such as textual similar-
ity among messages or friendship in a social network, but
can fail when spammers start new campaigns that are not
connected to previously known ones.
In this paper, we integrate these ideas into a flexible
method for classifying social spam: Extended Group-based
Graphical models for Spam (EGGS). EGGS begins with pre-
dictions from an independent classifier, which can use any
number of domain-appropriate features. To incorporate rela-
tionships among different messages, EGGS defines groups
of related messages that have the same author, the same
text, or other domain-specific similarities such as the same
hashtags. A message can be in multiple groups represent-
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ing different types of relationships. Related messages are
more likely to have the same label, although this proba-
bility may depend on the type of relationship. EGGS mod-
els these relationships with a probabilistic graphical model,
using one of four different approaches: stacked graphical
learning (SGL) (Kou and Cohen 2007), Markov logic net-
works (MLNs) (Richardson and Domingos 2006), proba-
bilistic soft logic (PSL) (Bach et al. 2015), or a new com-
bination of SGL with either MLNs or PSL (Figure 1). We
show that this integrated approach can accurately detect
spam on large real-world datasets for multiple domains, re-
quiring very few modifications.
In spite of the breadth of prior work in this area, most
other methods fall short in one of three ways:
• They’re specialized for another domain, such as detect-
ing fake reviews or auction fraud. Social spam has its
own structures which are distinct from other adversarial
domains. Nonetheless, we can still generalize among dif-
ferent social spam domains. In Section , we introduce a
general framework for social spam and apply it to Sound-
Cloud, Twitter, YouTube, and Wikipedia.
• They ignore content and other features, and only use the
relational structure plus a small number of known labels.
In Section , we show that new social spam is often un-
connected to previously seen spam, and that social spam
forms many distinct connected components. This means
that labels on the training data or a small number of labels
in the test data will not cover most spam.
• They ignore relational structure and make predictions
for each message independently. Our empirical results
show that exploiting relational structure can lead to sub-
stantially improved performance over independent pre-
dictions.
Our primary contributions are EGGS, a flexible method
for social network spam that overcomes all three of the
above limitations, and the application and evaluation of
EGGS on three different domains. As secondary contribu-
tions, we show that stacked graphical learning can be com-
bined with other probabilistic models for improved perfor-
mance, and that relational modeling can scale to large do-
mains using simple methods.
Related Work
We give a brief overview of the many techniques used to de-
tect spam from both independent and relational perspectives.
Spam Detection
Much of the work done on social spam filtering involves an
analysis of some narrow set of specific independent features.
Bag-of-words models have been popular ever since the rise
of email spam, and continue to see use in Youtube and Twit-
ter models (Song, Lau, and Yin 2014; Mateen et al. 2017;
Xu, Sun, and Javaid 2016). Word embeddings (Savigny and
Purwarianti 2017) and LDA topic modeling (Song, Lau, and
Yin 2014) have also been effective. Numerous works fo-
cus on URLs (Benevenuto et al. 2010; Mateen et al. 2017;
Ghosh et al. 2012; Wang and Pu 2015; Gao et al. 2012;
Stringhini, Kruegel, and Vigna 2010; Wang 2010; Chu, Wid-
jaja, and Wang 2012), while others look at hashtags (Ma-
teen et al. 2017; Ferragina, Piccinno, and Santoro 2015;
Ma, Sun, and Cong 2013; Sedhai and Sun 2015; Wang 2010;
Chu, Widjaja, and Wang 2012) and mentions (Mateen et al.
2017; Wang 2010; Chu, Widjaja, and Wang 2012). Each of
these have unique advantages, but they can all be seen as
content-related features, derived directly from the messages
themselves.
User-based features attempt to characterize the behavior
of a user in the network with the hope that this will distin-
guish normal users from malicious ones. A popular approach
is to capture the ‘burstiness’ of user activity (Fei et al. 2013;
Gao et al. 2012; KC and Mukherjee 2016; Li et al. 2017;
Song, Lau, and Yin 2014; Viswanath et al. 2014). Other ap-
proaches look at the number of follows (Mateen et al. 2017;
Benevenuto et al. 2010), the types and sequences of user ac-
tions (Fakhraei et al. 2015; Viswanath et al. 2014), the ratio
of different types of messages users send (Gao et al. 2012),
and account profiles (Mateen et al. 2017; Chu, Widjaja, and
Wang 2012). Graph-based features are conceptually a sub-
set of user-based features, and are derived specifically from
a directed graph built using user interactions (e.g. one user
following another) on which graph features such as pager-
ank, betweenness, in/out degree, etc. are computed (Ma-
teen et al. 2017; Fakhraei et al. 2015; Gao et al. 2012;
Wang and Pu 2015; Wang 2010). Similarly, works such
as CopyCatch (Beutel et al. 2013), CatchSync (Jiang et al.
2014), Fraudar (Hooi et al. 2016), and Gang (Wang 2010)
use the subgraph density of the graph topology to detect
anomalous behavior.
Many of these works use a combination of approaches
mentioned above, and Mateen et al. (Mateen et al. 2017) in-
vestigate a more comprehensive hybrid approach combining
features from all three categories to detect spam on Twitter.
Collective Filtering
The works by Pandit et al. and Akoglu et al. (Pandit et al.
2007; Akoglu, Chandy, and Faloutsos 2013), NetProbe and
FraudEagle, use Markov random fields (MRFs) with belief
propagation (BP) to detect fraudsters on eBay and the Soft-
ware Market App Store using only the network structure
of users and products, with the edges between them repre-
senting positive or negative reviews (Jindal and Liu 2007);
Akoglu et al. (Rayana and Akoglu 2015) expand upon this
with SpEagle, generating unsupervised priors for users and
products to propagate in the network structure. Li et al. (Li et
al. 2014a) use iterative classification (ICA) between review,
user, and IP nodes to detect spammers on Dianping, a net-
work similar to Yelp. These are all unsupervised methods,
which are especially useful for detecting opinion spam (Jin-
dal and Liu 2007) because true labels are often difficult to
obtain for this problem domain; this has the added benefit of
not having to train an additional supervised classifier on sep-
arate data to generate priors to propagate. For social spam,
labeled training data is more prevalent, allowing us to build
more powerful priors using supervised classifiers, which are
then propagated by our relational methods.
Works on social spam, such as Duan et al. (Duan et al.
2012), experiment using ICA, BP, and relaxation labeling on
the message-message graph connected by similar URLs and
hashtags to classify topics on a small Twitter dataset. Li et
al. (Li et al. 2014b) use typed MRFs, connecting users with
URLs and tweet bursts to spot spam campaign promoters on
Twitter. Fakhraei et al. (Fakhraei et al. 2015) leverage user
reports using PSL to find spammers in the on-line dating
network IfWe; however, the relational rules were only rele-
vant to a small proportion of users, reducing the effective-
ness of joint reasoning. Castillo et al. (Castillo et al. 2007)
use stacked graphical learning (SGL) to introduce one new
relational feature in addition to their original features to bet-
ter detect spam hosts on the Webspam-UK2006 dataset.
Matrix factorization methods are a complementary ap-
proach. Zhu et al. (Zhu et al. 2012) encode user-user re-
lations from different user interaction types using collec-
tive matrix factorization (Singh and Gordon 2008) to detect
spammers on RenRen. Shen et al. (Shen and Liu 2015) ex-
tend this by adding a social interaction coefficient to spot
spammers on Twitter. Chen et al. (Chen, Tan, and Jain 2009)
tackle the spam and spammer problems simultaneously us-
ing relations between users and bookmarks on the website:
delicious.com. Wu et al. (Wu et al. 2015) take the same ap-
proach but use different relations (user-user, user-message,
and message-message connected by URLs and hashtags) to
work on the platform Sina Weibo.
Methodology
We now introduce Extended Group-based Graphical models
for Spam (EGGS), our framework for detecting social net-
work spam. The basic approach is to predict the label of each
message using standard classification methods, and then re-
fine those predictions using relational reasoning methods on
groups of related messages. EGGS is not a single, mono-
lithic method, but a general approach that can incorporate
any domain-specific features and relations, any type of clas-
sifier, and any type of probabilistic graphical model. In the
following, we describe a set of features and methods that
work well for detecting social network spam in several do-
mains.
Independent Modeling
We begin with a standard classifier, which we refer to as
the “independent model,” since it makes predictions for each
message separately. We highlight engineered features shown
to work well for spam classification in social networks based
on previous research. In addition to the features listed here,
it is easy to extend our method to add others for different
domains.
Content-based Features We use the text of each message
to generate content-based features such as: the number of
characters, hashtags, links, and the top 10,000 tri-grams (se-
lected based on term frequency) used as binary features (Ta-
ble 1: Content).
User-based Features We aggregate user actions (although
any relevant entity in the domain may be used: users,
URLs, tracks, videos, hashtags) to create user-based fea-
tures (Table 1: User). Features are computed in sequential
order of messages based on their timestamp. For example,
when computing the feature UserUploads for message #100
posted by user x, we record the number of tracks uploaded
by user x up until message #100. This creates a more realis-
tic scenario as features are computed only based on previous
messages.
Graph-based Features As done in prior work
(e.g., (Fakhraei et al. 2015)), we create graph features
using a list of follower actions. We can represent this list
of affiliations as a graph, where we construct a node for
every user in the list, and add a directed edge from user
x to user y whenever user x starts to follow user y. Then
we compute the following features on the resulting graph:
Pagerank (Page et al. 1999), Triangle count (Schank and
Wagner 2005), K-core (Alvarez-Hamelin et al. 2006),
In/Out-degree (Newman, Strogatz, and Watts 2001) (Ta-
ble 1: Graph). Each feature represents a different aspect of
connectivity for a user to the community, and capitalizes on
the assumption that spammers tend to be less connected than
non-spammers (Fakhraei et al. 2015), or more connected
with other suspicious users.
Table 1: Independent Model Features
Content
NumChars # chars in msg (Sanchez et al. 2011)
NumHashtags # hashtags in msg (Mateen et al. 2017)
NumLinks # links in msg (Gao et al. 2012).
NumMentions # mentions in msg (Chu et al. 2012).
IsRetweet 1 if msg is a retweet (Jiang et al. 2011).
Polarity Msg. polarity (Sanchez et al. 2011).
Subjectivity Msg. subjectivity (Sanchez et al. 2011).
N-grams Top 10,000 tri-grams (Song et al. 2014).
User
UMsgs # msgs posted per user (Mateen et al. 2017).
UHRatio Frac. user msgs w/ a # (Mateen et al. 2017).
UMRatio Frac. user msgs w/ a @ (Chu et al. 2012).
ULRatio Frac. user msgs w/ a URL (Gao et al. 2012).
UBlacklist 1 if user posts 3+ spam (Chu et al. 2012).
UWhitelist 1 if user posts 10+ ham (Chu et al. 2012).
UMsgMax Max msg len by user (Sanchez et al. 2011).
UMsgMin Min msg len by user (Sanchez et al. 2011).
UMsgMean Avg msg len by user (Sanchez et al. 2011).
TMsgs # msgs per track.
Graph
Pagerank Pagerank of each node in the
follower graph G (Page et al. 1999).
TriCnt # triangles per node (Schank et al. 2005).
KCore Iteration node is
pruned (Alvarez et al 2006).
InDegree # edges entering node (Newman et al. 2001).
OutDegree # edges leaving node (Newman et al. 2001).
Relational Modeling
EGGS uses several types of relational modeling, separately
or in combination, to improve on the independent model.
Table 2: Stacking Features
MMSRatio Fraction of spammy matching messages.
USRatio Fraction of spammy messages per user.
TSRatio Fraction of spammy messages per track.
HSRatio Fraction of spammy messages per hashtag.
MSRatio Fraction of spammy messages per mention.
LSRatio Fraction of spammy messages per link.
HSRatio Fraction of spammy messages per user hashtag.
Stacked Graphical Learning SGL (Kou and Cohen
2007) is a simple approach for performing collective clas-
sification, in which the label of each entity depends on the
labels of its neighbors. Since the true labels of the neighbors
are often unknown, SGL first uses an independent classifier
to predict the label of every entity. The predicted labels can
then be used to derive features for a second classifier, which
makes a refined prediction for each entity. This process can
be repeated multiple times, “stacking” classifiers on top of
classifiers to any depth.
We apply this idea to social network spam by defining
“pseudo-relational” features, each of which summarizes the
predicted labels of related messages (Table 2). For exam-
ple, “USRatio” is the fraction of messages written by the
same user which are predicted to be spam. Since most spam-
mers send multiple spam messages, a higher value of US-
Ratio indicates that the message is more likely to be spam.
We create pseudo-relational features based on each rela-
tion, contrary to the previous application of SGL on web-
spam where they create only one additional feature: the av-
erage predicted label of its neighbors. The learning proce-
dure is similar to previous approaches (Castillo et al. 2007;
Kou and Cohen 2007), except we use a holdout method in-
stead of cross-validation when building the sub-model for
each stack (Figure 2).
Using K stacks, we evenly split the training data D =⋃K
k D
k, and train a base model f0 on D0 = (X0g , y
0),
where X0g are the original features for D
0. Each subsequent
submodel fk trains on Dk with additional pseudo-relational
features:
fk =
{
train(Xkg , y
k) k = 0
train(Xkg +X
k
pk−1 , y
k) k > 1
Xjpk are pseudo-relational features for D
j using predictions
from fk, which we can define as a function of Xjg and yˆ
j
k
(predictions for Dj from fk):
Xjpk = S(X
j
g , yˆ
j
k)
where
yˆjk =
{
fk(Xjg) j > 0, k = 0
fk(Xjg + S(X
j
g , yˆ
j
k−1)) j > 1, k > 0, k < j
Then given test data,X ′, inference is the same as the original
SGL (Kou and Cohen 2007):
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Figure 2: Stacked graphical learning with K stacks using the
holdout method.
yˆ′0 = f
0(X ′g)
For k = 1...K:
X ′pk = S(X
′
g, yˆ
′
k−1)
yˆ′k = f
k(X ′g +X
′
pk
)
return yˆ′k
This holdout method builds submodels in sequential or-
der of the data, while also computing the pseudo-relational
features in sequential order. This makes the problem more
realistic since we do not ignore the temporal component of
the data, contrary to the cross-validation technique. How-
ever, this comes with a cost; the cross-validation tech-
nique (Castillo et al. 2007; Kou and Cohen 2007) trains each
submodel on the entire training set. Thus, more stacks gen-
erally does not decrease performance. In our case, the higher
K becomes, the less data each submodel has to train on,
introducing the possibility of underfit models. In practice,
we find that 1-2 stacks works best, which is consistent with
previous works (Castillo et al. 2007; Kou and Cohen 2007;
Fast and Jensen 2008).
Flexible Joint Inference Statistical relational learning
(SRL) has developed various methods for doing collec-
tive classification (Getoor 2007), most promisingly using
probabilistic graphical models (PGMs). We experiment with
Markov logic networks (MLNs) (Richardson and Domingos
2006) and probabilistic soft logic (PSL) (Bach et al. 2015),
both of which use weighted formulas in first-order logic to
define a template for a PGM. Like stacking, the goal is to
improve the predicted label for each message by reasoning
about the labels of related messages. However, instead of
a sequential pipeline of classifiers, MLNs and PSL define
a joint distribution over all possible labelings and perform
probabilistic inference to reason about that distribution.
We use the formulas to capture our intuition about how
information should propagate among related messages, and
then describe how we use Markov logic and PSL to turn
these formulas into a full probabilistic model. Our relational
model contains two main components: priors (negative and
positive) and relations. The negative prior assumes that all
messages are non-spam, while the positive prior gives the
model information to propagate (Figure 3 (a,b)). We focus
on connecting messages to one another using any relation,
but our model may connect entities of any type together,
such as users, hashtags, URLs, etc.
The second part defines the relations to exploit from the
¬spam(e)
prior(e)→ spam(e)
hasRel(r, e) ∧ spam(e)→ spamRel(r)
hasRel(r, e) ∧ spamRel(r)→ spam(e)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 3: Generalized relational model represented as first
order logical rules. (a) Negative prior, (b) positive prior, (c,
d) hub-based relational rules; e is short for entity (typically
messages or users), r is short for relation.
m1 m2
m3 m4
m5 m6
m1 m2
m3 m4
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Rel
Figure 4: Pairwise connections between related mes-
sages (left). Hub approach connecting related mes-
sages (right).
network structure, grouping related messages together (Fig-
ure 3 (c,d)). Previous work using Markov networks for joint
reasoning over a set of related entities typically do so in a
direct fashion (Tan et al. 2013). For example, we could have
written rules (c) and (d) as:
spamRel(e1, e2) ∧ spam(e1)→ spam(e2) (1)
This type of modeling provides propagation directly from
one message to another, but makes it difficult to scale for
large groups of related entities. For example, a group of 100
related messages would need
(
100
2
)
edges to take care of ev-
ery possible interaction. Our concept of a ‘hub node’ essen-
tially creates a hyper-edge from one entity to all related en-
tities (Figure 4). This significantly reduces the number of
edges to be linear in the number of related entities. As infor-
mation starts to propagate, these ‘hub nodes’ become more
or less ‘spammy’, which in turn propagates to entities that
are difficult to detect at first, but become clear as their con-
nections to other entities are exploited.
We use the outputs of the supervised classifier as positive
priors for our joint prediction model, but it is important to
note that a message with no relations to any other messages
in the dataset will not be affected by this model.
MLN Implementation We first implement our relational
model as an MLN, and then convert our MLN into an MRF
using the Libra toolkit (Lowd and Rooshenas 2015) since
belief propagation in Libra is better optimized than infer-
ence in existing MLN implementations. We can convert our
MLN formulas into equivalent MRF factor potentials be-
tween a message node and a hub node (Table 3), where  is
tuned separately for each relation and inference is done us-
ing loopy belief propagation, similar to prior work on fraud
detection (Pandit et al. 2007; Rayana and Akoglu 2015).
Table 3: Factor Potential Definition per Relation
Message State
Hub State spam non-spam
spam 1 -  
non-spam  1 - 
PSL Implementation The second implementation of our
relational rules is as a PSL model, which builds a hinge-loss
Markov random field (HL-MRF)(Bach et al. 2015): a type of
log-linear model that uses hinge loss functions of the vari-
able states as features and can be modeled as a conditional
probability distribution as follows (Fakhraei et al. 2015):
P (Y |X) = 1
Z(ω)
exp
(
−
n∑
i=1
ωiφi(X,Y )
)
(2)
where φi is the set of n continuous potentials:
φi(X,Y ) = [max{0, `i(X,Y )}]pj , (3)
` is a linear function of X and Y, and pj ∈ {1,2}. We can
learn the weights to these rules from data using gradient de-
scent and expectation maximization (Bach et al. 2015).
Both of these models propagate information among the
same sets of related messages, but there is an important dif-
ference: loopy belief propagation in MLNs can combine un-
certain prior probabilities to arrive at more confident pos-
terior probabilities. For example, if n messages all the have
the same prior of 0.85, their posterior scores can be ‘pushed’
beyond 0.85, and this effect increases as n increases. On the
contrary, spam scores in the PSL model stop increasing once
their distance to satisfaction specified in (3) reaches zero.
Evaluation
We evaluate the effectiveness of EGGS at finding spam in
four social network domains. We use the area under the
precision-recall curve (AUPR) as our main metric. AUPR
measures the ability to find most of the positive examples
(spam) without too many negative examples (non-spam).
With highly imbalanced classes, as in our SoundCloud
dataset (1.6% spam), AUPR is usually a better way to dif-
ferentiate between classifiers than alternatives such as area
under the ROC curve.
Spam Detection
We evaluate our methods on spam data from three social
networks: SoundCloud, YouTube, and Twitter. Sound-
Cloud is an online music sharing network where users
can upload original tracks that other users can listen to
and comment on. This dataset includes all comments
posted from 10/10/2012 to 9/30/2013 on approximately 8M
tracks (Table 4). YouTube is a video sharing service similar
to SoundCloud. The data1 was collected from 10/31/2011
to 1/17/2012 with a focus on the most viewed and top-rated
videos (O’Callaghan et al. 2012). This dataset contains
no user subscription attributes (analogous to followers
1http://mlg.ucd.ie/yt/
Table 4: Basic Statistics per Domain
Entity SoundCloud YouTube Twitter
messages 42,783,305 6,431,471 8,845,979
spam 684,338 481,334 1,722,144
users 5,505,634 2,860,264 4,831,679
spammers 128,016 177,542 843,002
follows 335,000,000 N/A 128,000,000
in SoundCloud and Twitter), as the data collectors were
often restricted from this information (O’Callaghan et al.
2012). We use the Twitter HSpam14 Dataset2, curated from
1/5/2013 to 6/31/2013 with a hashtag-oriented focus (Sedhai
and Sun 2015).
Social network spam evolves rapidly, so a method that
works well one month may work poorly the next. We incor-
porate this into our experiments by creating ten test sets for
each domain, partitioned chronologically. Predictions from
each test set are concatenated into one large test set, on
which the AUPR is computed. Different test sets may reflect
different spam campaigns, user policy changes for the net-
work, and changing usage patterns among legitimate users
over time. For each test set, we use data from the preceding
time period for training3. This ensures that each prediction
is only made using data from the past, never the future.
SoundCloud is evenly split into ten non-overlapping sub-
sets of roughly 4M messages each (70% training, 1.25%
validation, and 28.75% testing). We exploit the following
relations between messages: users (messages posted by the
same user), text (messages with similar text), and links (mes-
sages with similar links). YouTube is split into ten overlap-
ping subsets of roughly 2M messages each (75% training,
2.5% validation, and 28.5% testing). Since this dataset only
contains 6.4M messages, these subsets contain some over-
lap, but the test sets remain mutually exclusive, and we use
the following relations: users and text. Twitter is evenly split
into ten non-overlapping subsets of roughly 880K messages
(70% training, 6% validation, and 24% testing); we use the
following relations: users, text, and user hashtags (hashtags
posted by a given user). We learn the weights for our PSL
model on the validation data, and pre-tune  in the MRF
model for each relation.
Independent Model Performance
We use logistic regression as our independent classifier,
since it generally outperformed other methods such as tree
ensembles during development. Before testing our rela-
tional methods, we perform ablation tests on the indepen-
dent model to determine which feature sets contribute the
most. We test each feature set in isolation and in combina-
tion with each other on the first 10% of the data for each
domain using 70% for training and tuning, and the remain-
ing 30% for testing (Figure 5). The effectiveness of differ-
2http://www.ntu.edu.sg/home/axsun/datasets.html
3For the Twitter dataset, time information was not available, so
the tweets were ordered based on tweet ID.
ent feature types varies from domain to domain. For Sound-
Cloud, a combination of content, graph, and user features
(c+g+u) yields the best results; n-gram features are not very
helpful. For YouTube and Twitter, the opposite is true: n-
gram features on their own work almost as well as all feature
types put together.
Relational Modeling Performance
We perform four sets of experiments to test our relational
models’ capability of detecting spam. The ‘full’ experiments
use all available features when learning and making pre-
dictions. The ‘limited’ experiments exclude some of the
most informative features: we remove n-gram features from
YouTube and Twitter, and graph features from SoundCloud.
This makes the prediction problem more challenging, testing
the ability of our relational methods to compensate for lim-
ited information. In adversarial settings like spam, it’s com-
mon to only have limited or noisy information, since spam-
mers quickly adapt their messages and networks to evade
detection.
We also evaluate our models for test instances that have
no relational connections to any messages in the training
sets (Inductive), in addition to evaluating all test instances
(Inductive + Transductive). For SoundCloud, a small num-
ber of connected components covers a significant portion of
ham and spam messages (Figure 6), but this is less so for
YouTube and Twitter, where transductive methods would
need more and more known labels to propagate to the in-
creasingly disconnected pockets of related messages.
In all settings, we compare against predictions from the
independent model (top row). Then we start to incorporate
relational structure, applying our joint inference models to
the outputs of the independent model as well as to the re-
lationally augmented independent models, which use up to
two levels of stacked learning.
We find that not only can relational modeling improve
performance for these domains (Table 5), but in many cases
stacked learning and joint reasoning work well together,
achieving the best performance in many of the experiments.
In the case of the limited feature set, relational modeling
is able to improve performance for all three domains; in
the fully featured case, relational modeling improves perfor-
mance for the SoundCloud and YouTube domains. For Twit-
ter, the independent model is already very effective when
trained with n-grams (AUPR=0.95); stacked learning and
joint inference offer no additional benefit. Against an evasive
adversary that changes text to avoid detection, the indepen-
dent model would be less effective and relational modeling
more likely to help.
Comparing the different relational methods, we find that
no one method dominates; thus, when applying EGGS to
a new spam domain, we recommend testing several meth-
ods on validation data before committing to a single model.
Having more layers in stacking sometimes helps a lot, es-
pecially in the Inductive + Transductive setting. For exam-
ple, on the limited Twitter dataset, SGL goes from 0.494 to
0.612 AUPR with the addition of a second layer, SGL+PSL
goes from 0.523 to 0.594, and SGL+MRF goes from 0.513
to 0.630. In other cases, such as the full SoundCloud dataset
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Figure 5: Feature set performance for SoundCloud (left), YouTube (middle), and Twitter (right).
Table 5: Spam Detection Performance (AUPR)
Inductive Inductive + Transductive
Model SoundCloud YouTube Twitter SoundCloud YouTube Twitter
L
im
ite
d
Independent 0.396 0.148 0.260 0.352 0.387 0.466
SGL(1) 0.396 0.221 0.281 0.444 0.453 0.494
SGL(2) 0.342 0.263 0.275 0.364 0.478 0.612
PSL 0.363 0.225 0.249 0.332 0.438 0.498
MRF 0.431 0.164 0.264 0.547 0.404 0.483
SGL(1) + PSL 0.284 0.268 0.258 0.521 0.471 0.523
SGL(1) + MRF 0.412 0.239 0.285 0.578 0.473 0.513
SGL(2) + PSL 0.243 0.282 0.270 0.562 0.489 0.594
SGL(2) + MRF 0.404 0.276 0.280 0.583 0.493 0.630
Fu
ll
Independent 0.409 0.321 0.860 0.460 0.539 0.950
SGL(1) 0.434 0.440 0.848 0.530 0.614 0.946
SGL(2) 0.369 0.439 0.838 0.483 0.617 0.942
PSL 0.458 0.337 0.823 0.469 0.569 0.927
MRF 0.487 0.347 0.857 0.579 0.557 0.948
SGL(1) + PSL 0.289 0.433 0.817 0.602 0.588 0.925
SGL(1) + MRF 0.489 0.439 0.845 0.604 0.609 0.944
SGL(2) + PSL 0.324 0.426 0.813 0.582 0.581 0.923
SGL(2) + MRF 0.435 0.438 0.835 0.604 0.614 0.939
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Figure 6: (a) The number of connected components it takes
to cover the first 5M messages for each domain. (b) Percent-
age of ham/spam test set messages with at least one connec-
tion to any training messages.
in the Inductive setting, performance can drop: SGL goes
from 0.434 to 0.369, and SGL+MRF goes from 0.489 to
0.435. With more layers, each classifier in SGL is trained on
less data, which may explain why performance sometimes
decreases.
MRF usually achieves better AUPR than PSL: out of the
12 combinations of datasets and inductive or transductive
settings, MRF outperforms PSL on 8, SGL(1)+MRF outper-
forms SGL(1)+PSL on 10, and SGL(2)+MRF outperforms
SGL(2)+PSL on 11.4 However, PSL usually achieves better
AUROC, outperforming the MRF models in 25 out of 36
cases.
Conclusion
We have shown how to flexibly incorporate relational struc-
ture from multiple separate domains using several ap-
proaches to build EGGS, a spam detection system that at-
tacks the problem from as many angles as possible. Two of
these approaches share a general relational framework that
provides full joint inference over related messages, while
the pseudo-relational features can be added to any indepen-
dent model without the need for more complexity. We see
that these methods are effective on real-world large-scale
datasets in isolation and in combination with one another.
Furthermore, if these specific techniques are a poor fit to a
new domain, EGGS can easily be adapted to include other
features, other types of classifiers, and other relational rea-
soning methods.
4This would be statistically significant under a binomial test (29
successes out of 36 trials), but the trials are not independent.
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